Firm Heterogeneity and Firm Behavior with Conditional Policies by Svetlana Demidova & Kala Krishna
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2007 by Svetlana Demidova and Kala Krishna. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to
exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including
© notice, is given to the source.Firm Heterogeneity and Firm Behavior with Conditional Policies
Svetlana Demidova and Kala Krishna




This paper shows that the result of Ju and Krishna (2002, 2005), i.e., the non-monotonicity in the comparative
statics across regimes, disappears, if exporters differ in their productivities, which provides very different









523 Kern Graduate Building
The Pennsylvania State University
University Park, PA 16802
and NBER




Princeton University, Penn State University and NBER
December 2006.
Abstract
This paper shows that the result of Ju and Krishna (2002, 2005), i.e., the non-monotonicity
in the comparative statics across regimes, disappears, if exporters di⁄er in their productivities,
which provides very di⁄erent predictions about the results of policy changes.
Keywords: Firm heterogeneity, rules of origin.
JEL classi￿cation codes: F12, F13.
1 Introduction
Trade and domestic policies are often conditional: certain conditions must be met to obtain certain
bene￿ts. Content protection schemes in developing countries are one example. They require ￿rms
in an industry to use at least some level of domestic inputs. Free Trade Area preferences for
members are another example. Producers in the FTA become eligible for zero tari⁄s on their
exports to a partner if the product meets Rules of Origin (ROOs) or special constraints that must
be met in order to obtain origin. Otherwise, they pay the going tari⁄. Our paper argues that ￿rm
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1homogeneity plays a key role in the analyses of such policies. By using a particular policy, the level
of ROOs in the FTA, for illustrative purposes, we show that a key result of these analyses vanishes
when ￿rm heterogeneity is allowed. This provides a cautionary note in interpreting such results.
Ju and Krishna (2002, 2005) show that even when ￿rms are homogeneous, assuming they all
make the same choices is not correct. Ex ante identical ￿rms can behave di⁄erently in equilibrium
if they are indi⁄erent between their alternatives. They show that there are two possible regimes:
in the homogeneous regime all ￿rms choose the unique most pro￿table option. In their example,
content protection requires greater use (than dictated by cost minimization considerations alone)
of the domestic input, labor. When all ￿rms want to meet this requirement, a stricter restriction
shifts the demand for labor, raising its price. In the other regime, the heterogeneous one, some
￿rms choose one option while others choose the other. Indi⁄erence between these options must be
maintained as the restriction becomes stricter. At given wages, stricter ROOs make pro￿ts from
meeting the requirement fall below those from not doing so. To keep pro￿ts equal, input prices must
fall! As a result, the comparative statics for input prices, and through them for other variables, are
exact opposites in the two regimes. Previous work, they argued, was thus incomplete, as it only
dealt with the homogeneous regime, and misleading, as it had very di⁄erent comparative statics
properties from the heterogeneous one.
In this paper, we show that this is not the entire story either. Introducing di⁄erences in ￿rm
productivity, which is also more consistent with the empirical evidence1, leads to another margin
of adjustment, namely, the identity of the marginal ￿rm, eliminating the non-monotonicity in the
comparative statics which is the key result in Ju and Krishna (2002, 2005). In fact, the comparative
statics properties are always like those associated with Ju and Krishna￿ s heterogeneous regime
rather than those of the standard homogeneous regime! In the presence of ￿rm heterogeneity,
1See, for example, Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004, 2005).
2stricter requirements change the composition of ￿rms. These changes produce the same monotonic
adjustments in endogenous variables in both regimes.
We model ROOs similarly to Demidova, Kee and Krishna (2006), allowing ROOs to a⁄ect both
the ￿xed and marginal costs of exporting and introduce ￿rm heterogeneity as in Melitz (2003).
2 The Model
Consider a small country with L consumers, each of which supplies one unit of labor. Preferences








; 0 < ￿ < 1;
where ￿ is the set of available domestic varieties; q(v) is the consumption of variety v; and ￿ = 1
1￿￿
is the elasticity of substitution between varieties. The demand functions are q (v) = RP￿￿1p(v)
￿￿
and z = RP￿￿1pz




v2￿ p(v)1￿￿dv: We normalize the price of the imported variety pz to 1.
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive heterogenous ￿rms of a ￿xed mass M.2





; ￿ > ￿: A ￿rm
with productivity level ’ has 1
’ per-unit labor requirement.
The ￿rm may also choose to export. The foreign demand3 for domestic variety v is Bpx (v)
￿￿,
i.e., we are dealing with a small open economy that has no impact on the rest of the world. Each
exporter pays a per-unit tari⁄ ￿ > 1 and a ￿xed cost fx. In addition, it can pay a documentation
￿xed cost d and invoke the preferences it has been given. However, to access these preferences, it
has to meet some ROOs; which allow the ￿rm to escape paying ￿ < 1 share of tari⁄ ￿; but involve
2We assume that M is ￿xed to follow the assumptions in Ju and Krishna (2002, 2005) as closely as possible since
their analysis deals with the medium run, where ￿rms can choose what to do but where their mass is given.
3Note that we model the foreign demand for domestic variety similarly to Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2006).
3an additional per-unit cost ￿ > 1; since now the product has to satisfy origin requirements. The




q, Cx (’;q) =
w￿
’
q + wfx; Cx;ROO (’;q) =
w￿ (￿￿)
’
q + wfx + wd;
where w is the wage. As a result, the prices set in each case are, respectively, pd (’) = w
￿’;
px (’) = w￿
￿’; and px;ROO (’) =
w￿(￿￿)
￿’ : For simplicity we assume there are no ￿xed costs of producing
for the domestic market. Thus, all ￿rms in the economy use this option. Moreover, the revenues




















; ￿x (’) =
rx (’)
￿
￿ wfx; and ￿x;ROO (’) =
rx;ROO (’)
￿
￿ w(fx + d):
Thus, a ￿rm maximizes ￿d (’)+maxf0;￿x (’);￿x;ROO (’)g: We can rewrite ￿x;ROO (’) as ￿x (’)+









￿ wd is additional pro￿ts from invoking


























Only ￿rms with ’ > ’￿
x export, and ￿rms with ’ > ’￿
x;ROO invoke ROOs while exporting. Note
4The subscript denotes the option used by a ￿rm, i.e., "d" denotes domestic production, "x" denotes exporting
without ROOs, and "x,ROO" denotes exporting with ROOs:
5An Appendix with detailed proofs and derivations is available upon request.
6Similarly, we can de￿ne rx;r (’) = rx;ROO (’) ￿ rx (’) as additional revenues from invoking ROOs:
4that if ￿￿ > 1; then no ￿rm will invoke ROOs: We assume that ￿￿ < 1: From (1) and (2),
’￿
x;ROO = AROO’￿










i.e., if AROO > 1, ’￿
x;ROO > ’￿
x. Thus, we need to consider two cases. First, if ROOs are relatively
strict and documentation costs are large, then AROO > 1 and only the most productive exporters
meet ROOs. This is analogous to the heterogenous regime in Ju and Krishna (2002, 2005), where
the restriction is strict enough so that ￿rms are not strictly better o⁄ meeting it. Second, if ROOs
are lax and documentation costs are small, then AROO ￿ 1 and all exporting ￿rms meet ROOs.
This is analogous to the homogeneous regime in Ju and Krishna (2002, 2005).
The Heterogenous Regime. If AROO > 1; then ’￿
x;ROO > ’￿
x; i.e., only some share of
exporters invoke ROOs: As depicted in Figure 1(a), the pro￿ts of exporters are linear in ’￿￿1:
Moreover, the line corresponding to ￿x (’) is ￿ atter than the line corresponding to ￿x;ROO (’),
since ￿￿ < 1; and has a higher intercept. The intersection of these lines gives the productivity cuto⁄
’￿
x;ROO; so that ￿rms with ’ > ’￿
x;ROO export with invoking ROOs and getting tari⁄ preferences
as additional pro￿ts from doing so cover the documentation cost d. Firms with ’ 2 [’￿
x;’￿
x;ROO)
export without meeting ROOs; while ￿rms with ’ < ’￿
x do not export at all. Aggregate income in
















￿x (’)MdG(’) = wMxfx [￿ ￿ 1]; ￿ =
￿






￿x;r (’)MdG(’) = wMx;ROOd[￿ ￿ 1];
7Since M is ￿xed, rents are not competed away ex ante and so must enter income.

























































￿w(fx+d) (b) Homogeneous Regime
and Mx = (1 ￿ G(’￿
x))M = (’￿
x)



























There are 2 unknown variables, ’￿
x and w8, and 2 equilibrium conditions: the supply side of the










Using (4) and the fact that P￿￿1 = 1
1+￿; the left hand side of (5) can be rewritten as













: By equalizing them, we get our ￿nal equilibrium condition:










[￿￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1) + (￿ ￿ 1)￿￿]; (6)
where ￿￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1) =
￿￿￿(￿￿1)




x;ROO can be found from (3).






















from (6), w is decreasing in ’￿
x: We can depict both relationships in Figure 2(a). The intersection
of two curves gives w and ’￿
x in the equilibrium.







shifting the curve corresponding to (6) down as shown in Figure 2(b), and reducing ’￿
x and w in
the equilibrium. Substituting for w in terms of ’￿

























The only variable in (7) is ’￿
x;ROO: Stricter ROOs increase AROO; which raises the right hand
side of (7), and as a result, ’￿
x;ROO must rise. Thus, stricter ROOs raise ’￿
x;ROO:
Proposition 1 When not all ￿rms export by invoking preferences, stricter ROOs reduce the wage
while reducing the export cuto⁄ and raising the cuto⁄ for those invoking ROOs:
The intuition behind these results is the following. First, assume that wage does not change as
ROOs become stricter. Then, the pro￿ts of exporters, who do not invoke ROOs; remain unchanged.
But the productivity cuto⁄ of exporters who meet ROOs rises, while their mass falls. Thus, the
aggregate pro￿ts from exporting, ￿x+￿x;r; as well as consumers￿income, fall, reducing the demand
7for each domestic variety and the demand for labor. The equilibrium in the labor market cannot
be restored through the exit of ￿rms, thus, wage must fall, making exporting without ROOs more
attractive so that the productivity cuto⁄ for exporters ’￿
x falls.
The Homogeneous Regime. The analysis is very similar to that above. When AROOs ￿ 1,
all exporters invoke ROOs: As depicted in Figure 1(b), the intersection of two lines lies below the














1￿￿ = ￿w(fx + d): (8)











are 2 unknown variables, ’￿





rx;ROO (’)MdG(’): Using the same technique as before, it can be rewritten as


































must fall, i.e., ’￿
x;ROO must rise. The intuition in this case is the same as
before: at a given w, stricter ROOs raise the productivity cuto⁄ of exporters all of whom invoke
ROOs; reducing their number, aggregate income and the labor demand, so that wage has to fall.
Finally, note that whether or not all exporters meet ROOs; stricter ROOs always reduce wages
and raise the productivity of those who meet ROOs. Thus, even in the ￿homogeneous case￿changes
in the extensive margin prevent wages from rising in response to stricter ROOs:
83 Conclusion
What should we take away from this simple exercise? We see our results as not being merely a
comment on the generality of an existing paper but as having a broader message. If, as seems empir-
ically indisputable, ￿rms di⁄er in their productivities, making the traditional assumption that ￿rms
are identical and behave identically will give the opposite result from allowing for heterogeneity.
Why? Because the adjustment on the extensive margin is large and overwhelms the response on the
intensive margin. As ROOs become tighter, ￿rms that continue to meet ROOs demand more labor,
raising wages. This e⁄ect operates via the intensive margin. But ￿rms who stop meeting ROOs
demand less labor, pushing wages down. This extensive margin adjustment dominates! Models
which only allow for the intensive margin to operate may, thus, give very misleading results.
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